WiZiQ lecture on Hegel’s Social Philosophy part 1-3 (complete) – July 17th 2018

Lecture on the concepts of Freedom and Liberty. We have been reading par. 4-9 of the Introduction to the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Outline of the Philosophy of Right), published in 1820.
Next lecture is scheduled for Tuesday, July 24th, 7.30 PM CEST, at WiZiQ.com.






Law and Social Custom – the Rational Universality of Freedom Actualized – Remarks on #485 Encyclopedia

Basic Notes in the analysis of Enc. #485

Paragraph 485

1. This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculiar and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty.
Even though the single will experiences the limitations on the exercise of his freedom, and even though it has to obey authorities that are set above it, it is truly free. It may be difficult to understand, that the single will is not an absolute given, but a result, a product of the Rational organization of Society. The first and most immediate form of Liberty, therefore, is the connection between the free will of an individual, and the whole of the institutions that govern it. Liberty without limitations has no actuality, it is merely a phantasm. But this state of affairs is not a mystery. This is precisely the way the rationality of freedom appears. Universal an absolute constraint would be as irrational, as the notion of unlimited freedom.
2. As it (and its content) belongs to thought, and is the virtual universal, the content has its right and true character only in the form of universality.
The Liberty that we are talking about, as Hegel explained before,” belongs to thought”, i.e. is thoroughly rational. Freedom is not exercised within our needs, urges, drives or in general our search for happiness. (In this context Hegel speaks about the “mixedness and fortuitousness attaching to it in practical feeling and in impulse”) True freedom rests on our understanding of the truth of freedom. Precisely for that reason, it becomes important that we take freedom as a universal. Every human being is free in principle, the actuality of freedom must allow for the universality of freedom.
3. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousness, or instituted as an authoritative power, it is a Law.
The limitations of freedom do not appear as random obstacles, but they are themselves expressions of rationality. The obedience required by free subjects – and notice in passing that only free subjects can obey – is obedience to the universality of freedom expressed as law. Certainly, the law also has this side of “authoritative power” when it is enforced against our will. When our will acts against the universal freedom of others, it is the law that demands compliance with the Universal. The question can then be raised, whether a will that opposes universal freedom is itself rational. By forcing the irrational will into compliance with the rational and universal freedom of everyone, freedom is actualized.
4. When, on the other hand, the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness, attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse, and is set and grafted in the individual will, not in the form of impulse, but in its universality, so as to become its habit, temper, and character, it exists as manner and custom, or Usage.
A free individual, however, also experiences this universal rationality of freedom in the form of habit, temper, and character. The principles of freedom do not appear only as an external authority, but also as an internal habit, as self-evident and natural ways of doing things. Hegel is thinking of the way we are raised and grow up in the natural habitat of the family, in which our character and instinctive behaviors are formed. This immediate social morality is experienced as custom, or in Hegel’s German “Sitte”. That is also the original meaning of the Greek word ήθος, ethos, from which the modern English word “ethics” is derived.

Issues with the translation of paragraph 483 of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences by William Wallace.

I am using the translation of the Encyclopedia by Robert Wallace. English for me is a second language and I’m not fluent enough with it, to be able to translate German – also a second language for me – into English. I’m having a hard time as it is translating Hegel’s German into Dutch, my native tongue.

I think on the whole it is a very clever translation by someone who has a good grasp of Hegel’s way of thinking. But as with all translations, if you put them under a microscope you will find mistakes, arbitrary decisions, and sometimes misunderstandings of the original. Here are some comments on Wallace’s translation of a paragraph from the Encyclopedia. Just to remind you that we are discussing a philosopher that thought and wrote in German, and that the German text is the ultimate arbiter. A complete understanding of Hegel – if at all possible – can only be achieved by reading him in German.

Here is the German text:

Der objektive Geist [1] ist die absolute Idee, aber nur an sich seiend [2]; indem er damit auf dem Boden der Endlichkeit ist, behält seine wirkliche Vernünftigkeit [3] die Seite äußerlichen Erscheinens [4] an ihr. Der freie Wille hat [5] unmittelbar zunächst die Unterschiede an ihm, daß die Freiheit seine innere Bestimmung [6] und Zweck ist und sich auf eine äußerliche vorgefundene [7] Objektivität bezieht, welche sich spaltet [8] in das Anthropologische der partikulären Bedürfnisse, in die äußeren Naturdinge, die für das Bewußtsein sind, und in das Verhältnis von einzelnen zu einzelnen Willen, welche ein Selbstbewußtsein ihrer als verschiedener und partikulärer sind; diese Seite macht das äußerliche Material für das Dasein [9] des Willens aus.

Wallace translates § 483 as follows:

The objective Mind [1] is the absolute Idea, but only existing in posse: [2]and as it is thus on the territory of finitude, its actual rationality [3] retains the aspect of external apparency [4]. The free will finds itself immediately confronted [5] by differences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function [6] and aim, and is in relation to an external and already subsisting [7] objectivity, which splits up into different heads [8]: viz. anthropological data (i.e. private and personal needs), external things of nature which exist for consciousness, and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own diversity and particularity. These aspects constitute the external material for the embodiment [9] of the will.


[1] I don’t like the translation “Mind” for the German word “Geist”. Mind seems to express the sum of human mental capacities, something like soul in Hegel’s anthropology. It is connected to finite reason, Verstand in Hegel’s terminology. But I can’t think of any elements of the meaning of the word mind that express Geist. The rational nature of reality as such, the origin and meaning of reality, shouldn’t we translate that as Spirit? And it doesn’t help to capitalize Mind to make it into a technical term, because we can do that also with Spirit.

[2] I understand but I am not familiar with the expression “in posse” used here in the translation but it seems to obscure the function of Hegel’s frequently used technical term “an sich.” Wallace  means something like “potential” which is in other contexts perhaps possible, but that introduces a metaphysical terminology, where Hegel obviously stresses the logical function. The absolute idea is here at the level of its substantiality, that is in its being unto itself, simply “out there”, still without the important element of self-consciousness, hence it is just “objective” Spirit. To be “unto itself” basically signals a lack of relating actuality, that is essential for self-consciousness, that relates to itself in its other. The opposite of “in itself”, or “unto itself” is the “for itself”, that describes the movement towards itself, coming from its other. Whatever is fully developed in Hegel’s philosophy can therefore be called “in and for itself.”

[3] I would argue that rationality is the better translation for the German term Verstand. The word Reason could then be used to translate the German Vernunft. Finite reason is rationality, discursive thought, moving from one position to another by way of logical argument. Reason however is the rationality of the Spirit, and therefore also the inner rationality of Reality. We should make an effort to distinguish the two.

[4] Why use the word “apparency” for the German “Erscheinen”? Hegel is saying that the finite nature of the objective Spirit implies a distinction between its inner reason or essence, and it’s external appearance. So he is saying that the logical relationship between essence and appearance applies here. Why then “apparency”? Hegel stresses the appearance of freedom in the threefold externality of needs, natural objects, and particular persons with free will. That I can choose how to satisfy my needs, and can choose natural objects to do so, within the limits that arise from the fact that there are other persons around doing about the same, does not give us a full understanding of freedom, obviously. In these three areas in which my free will appears, it is not fully realized, i.e. not shown to be what it truly is.

[5] This is a mistake. The free will is not confronted with differences, but is immediately connected to specific differences, is determined by them, divides itself into them, e.g. that it’s freedom is an inner determinacy that is connected to an external objective world; in this external world it is itself threefold because it comprises particular needs, external things and the relation to other free wills.

[6] Hegel says that freedom is the inner determination and goal of the free will. Why is this inner or inward determination, “innere Bestimmung”, now translated as “function”?

[7] The German word “vorgefunden” just means that the object of the free will is simply taken as something that is out there. It is both external and passively accepted as being there. So I can see why it was necessary to use the Aristotelian word subsisting for that.

[8] Hegel is arguing that this external objectivity is threefold. Not because we can distinguish between anthropological, natural and social data, which seems to be the suggestion of the translation, but because this objectivity truly unfolds itself in three distinct manners. My free will aims at the satisfaction of my needs, ultimately wants to achieve happiness, by using natural objects only to find itself restrained by the free will of others. That is the phenomenal basis of theories of natural law that get stuck at this stage of the analysis and can’t move beyond it.

[9] Why use the word “embodiment” when Hegel uses the word “Dasein” which simply means “being there”, having some sort of determined existence?

You can see how difficult it is to translate Hegel, notoriously difficult. But still, when you look at Wallace’s result, you can see that it is still transparent to the original. The only problem I have with it, is the somewhat undisciplined rendering of the technical terminology of Hegel’s philosophy. Like the “in itself” that becomes “in posse”, or introduction of words beyond the original like “function”. More problematic is the way sometimes a translation stresses what is really in the background. Two examples in this translation are putting “private and personal needs” between brackets where in the text it is actually the main thing. The other is the use of the word “different heads” which suggests an external division instead of a truly in their movement of the objectivity that Hegel talks about; the original says “sich spaltet”, “divides itself into”, which for Hegel never mean something merely formal and external.

So this translation must be applauded for its level of philosophical understanding, yet, as do all translations, it loses much of the very precise and particular terminology that is in the original.

The Third Step in Hegel’s Method: the Speculative Moment

What have we found so far of Hegel’s method? Human finite rationality gives us an almost infinite series of specific thoughts, which we express in language and combine into sentences and propositions. Propositions may have truth claims connected to them. Dialectics, the second element in philosophical method, brings out the inner negation that makes these thoughts determined and distinct from each other. If dialectics can be the inner or immanent transition of a thought into its opposite and not an arbitrary and merely subjective application of the power of negation, the multiplicity of our thoughts gets a true connectedness. Our thoughts turn out to be elements within a whole; philosophy is a system, and method is the way this system is built up, the way in which concepts and propositions are being connected. According to Hegel this dialectic of our thoughts corresponds to a real dialectic in reality. Logic and metaphysics are two sides of the same coin.

Continue reading “The Third Step in Hegel’s Method: the Speculative Moment”