Summary of Abstract Right

In Hegel’s “Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences,” the chapter on Abstract Right delves into the foundational aspects of legal and moral philosophy. Hegel posits that property is an essential expression of the self, where individuals assert their identity and personality. This assertion of “this is mine” is a claim that must be recognized by others, thus property becomes an embodiment of personality.

Hegel further explores the notion of personhood and will, linking the concept of property to the recognition of individuals as persons who possess a will. This will is free and expressed through the ownership and exchange of property, which is fundamental to being recognized as a person with rights.

Contracts and exchange are central to Hegel’s understanding of social interactions. Contracts are agreements that establish ownership and create norms of mutual respect for individual rights and obligations. The economic life, governed by the free exchange of commodities, is based on these institutionalized notions of the individual as a right-bearing person.

Abstract Right, according to Hegel, is the system of mutual recognition among individuals who are considered as abstract, universal subjects. This system forms the basis of morality, which is the subjective side of social obligations institutionalized in contracts and the economic market. Morality is an abstract ideal, a vision of good based on mutual recognition of rights, and people are morally motivated through a sense of duty to defend these universal rights.

Hegel’s exploration of Abstract Right lays the groundwork for understanding how modern notions of individuality and rights are intertwined with social, economic, and political institutions. He addresses the potential alienation of individuals from the collective and the stresses that arise from modern conceptions of individual rights.

He critiques the “natural rights” present in social contract theories, suggesting that rights emerge from social and economic interactions rather than being inherent. Hegel’s analysis provides a complex understanding of the nature of rights, property, and personhood, and how these concepts are interwoven with the fabric of modern society, emphasizing the importance of mutual recognition and the institutionalization of rights in the development of moral obligations and the functioning of economic systems.

Hegel’s Social Philosophy – History #1

Though Hegel’s 1820 Philosophy of Right faced undue criticism during and after his life, being labeled an apology for Prussian absolutism, it was in fact an effort by Hegel to express the rational form of a reformed, modern European state and society. This vision was shared by individuals such as Baron von Stein and Prince von Hardenburg in Prussia, and was well-understood by Hegel’s friends and students.

At the heart of Hegel’s work is the notion that what constitutes right is essential for the realization of freedom. In this aspect, he stayed true to his Kantian roots while simultaneously breaking away from Kant. A key difference between the two philosophers lies in Hegel’s rejection of Kant’s assertion that freedom necessitates exercising a non-natural causality upon ourselves, one that exists outside the natural order and can initiate events without being affected by prior causal chains.

Hegel, on the other hand, saw freedom not as a form of causality, but rather as our ability to adopt a negative stance towards our inclinations, desires, and impulses. While both philosophers agreed that the will is fundamentally a form of practical reason guided by norms, Hegel disputed the notion that a special form of causality was required for such a will to be free.

According to Hegel, our freedom lies in our approach to our actions; we are truly free when we act based on reasons we can consider our own – those with which we identify ourselves. An individual’s preferences, desires, and impulses hold normative status only if they align with their overall life plan and contribute to their sense of identity.

Hegel believed that while there may be an empirical explanation for how our decisions ultimately move us, this would not be crucial for understanding why an action is considered one’s own or expresses one’s acknowledgment of their reasons for acting. The need for a special doctrine of transcendental causality would only arise if reasons were viewed as separate entities.

In the realm of human nature, the ability to possess a will signifies, foremost, the capacity for one’s actions to embody one’s practical commitments – emerging from and integrating within the grand design of one’s existence. Such actions are executed not due to extraneous reasons, but precisely because of these commitments.

Secondly, it entails the aptitude for introspection regarding these practical engagements, evaluating their relevance in relation to other objectives and principles an individual may contemplate. Lastly, it requires the comprehension that these obligations are self-imposed and not dictated by external forces.
To possess a will is to exhibit intentionality in our actions and adhere to established norms.

As Hegel discerned, the will is a manifestation of thought. Conversely, the absence of such liberty would entail acting based on factors one cannot rationally support or validate – ultimately succumbing to external influences such as unbridled desires or arbitrary societal customs.

Based on Pinkard, “Hegel”

Alienation as the Transition to Contract – part 2

As we delve into the latter portion of our discourse on alienation and the shift toward contract, allow me to first remark that within Hegel’s philosophy, the notion of property extends beyond a mere ideological endorsement of the ruling class – those who amass the lion’s share of possessions or dominate land ownership within a nation. Hegel’s interest lies not in championing the cause of the so-called Junkers or landowners; rather, his concept of property law serves a critical function.

Consider this fundamental truth: every individual possesses the right to own something. Property law encompasses all, excluding none. Consequently, no person may be deemed an object, a slave, or a mere vessel for another’s will or control. This principle emerges clearly in our examination of property alienation.

Returning to the idea of alienation, it signifies the withdrawal of one’s will from a specific object or possession. In both acquisition and relinquishment – or alienation – of property, the will reflects upon itself. Even as it surrenders its property to others, it remains connected to itself. Through alienation, it becomes evident that objects possess no rights; only persons bear such rights. Given that things lack volition, we hold dominion over their fate.

Yet this authority to alienate property applies solely to items appropriately classified as property – those inherently external in nature. Property concerns only that which exists outside of an individual’s being. Aspects not entirely external but intrinsic to one’s essence are exempt from property law and thus cannot undergo alienation. One’s personality and the core of one’s existence remain inviolable; they cannot be demoted to mere objects subject to another’s ownership rights.

The rationale behind this limitation is readily apparent: the very purpose of rights is to manifest freedom. No right exists for negating that freedom; otherwise, rights would become fundamentally ambiguous – simultaneously representing freedom and obliterating it. There can be no right to nullify one’s own personhood, for such an act would constitute a contradiction in terms.
In considering the matter of personhood, one must inevitably confront the absolute injustice of slavery. Within the confines of slavery, a person ceases to exist, replaced by an alienated being who no longer belongs to himself but to another. The slave’s will resides not within himself, but in the hands of his master, who degrades the individual to the status of property or mere thing.

Whether slavery is voluntary or forced becomes an inconsequential distinction. According to Hegel, voluntary slavery represents a contradiction, an act in opposition to one’s very nature. The free will cannot exist in attempting not to be free will; such a notion is inherently contradictory. One may not suspend their own rationality, conscience, or religious faith – these are not external factors but rather constitutive elements of one’s essence and personality.

When others dictate our beliefs or actions on our behalf, we surrender our own personalities. The matter becomes more complex when considering physical and spiritual aptitudes – while they are part of our being as individuals, they are not synonymous with our identities. In a limited capacity, one may renounce the right of property regarding labor and production.

Our activities do not wholly define us; we cannot be reduced solely to the tasks we perform. However, this does not extend to the totality of our time for labor and production. To alienate all available time for labor equates to enslavement, for the totality of expression is power itself.

A person is not merely the owner of his own life; life is not an external aspect of one’s personality. Rather, life encompasses the totality of all external activities and is an intrinsic part of being oneself. As such, Hegel contends that a person has no right to take his own life – doing so would imply standing above oneself in contradiction.

In conclusion, personhood stands as a bastion against the injustice of slavery and serves as a reminder that we are more than the sum of our actions, beliefs, and abilities. To preserve the sanctity of personhood, we must resist any form of enslavement that seeks to strip us of our inherent rights and freedoms.
Essential characteristics of alienation, a concept critical in comprehending the forthcoming discussion on the transition to contractual agreements.

Modern life, Greek life and the good life

In Jena, Hegel endeavored to blend the unity he perceived in Greek culture’s “ethical life” with the reflective and self-aware elements of modern “morality.” However, his exploration in the Phenomenology revealed the irreversible loss of Greek ethical life and the subsequent ascendance of the modern “moral worldview.” Hegel argued that this modern moral stance required a contemporary, Christian religious framework for us to come to terms with our collective historical position.

The extended audio version

Yet, his contemplation of modern discussions on legal codification and constitutionalism prompted Hegel to reassess his stance on ethical life. He concluded that not only was a modern ethical life feasible, but it was imperative for sustaining the legitimacy of modern concepts of legality and morality.

This prompted Hegel to refine one of his key assertions: that the only truly “unconditional” reasons for an agent are those integral to an admirable or “worthy” way of life. While this held true for Greek society, Hegel initially struggled to see how such unconditional reasons could manifest in modern contexts. The beauty and cohesion of Greek life contrasted starkly with the fragmented nature of modern existence, which seemed incapable of sustaining such unwavering commitment without a contemporary religion—possibly akin to Hegel’s own philosophy—to bind it together.

The Historic Context of Hegel’s Social Philosophy

Hegel’s Philosophy of Right was influenced by ongoing debates following Napoleon’s fall, particularly regarding constitutional reform and legal codification. Central themes include

• the tension between universalism and particularism,
• the evolution of Hegel’s political philosophy from Kantian terminology to his own idealist approach, and
• his critique of Savigny‘s view on law and identity.