The Transition from Property to Contract

We should now discuss the transition from property to contract. We have already produced a series of videos and articles on Hegel’s concept of property and a video on the concept of contract. But how does the transition between the two take place?

First of all, this transition is not external. That is, the concept of contract does not add anything new to the concept of property. On the contrary, the concept of contract is already contained in the concept of property. Property implies the idea of contract. This is not true of positive law or of the historical development of property and contract, but it is true from a philosophical perspective.

The category of contract is the explicit form of what is already contained in the category of property a its presupposition.

There is a conceptual connection between property and contract; they are not merely juxtaposed as two different forms of law. More importantly, in modern times, the concept of contract has become crucial to understanding the modern state. Contract is a central category in contemporary thinking about law and the state.

Hegel wants to clarify the meaning of the concept of contract in terms of the guiding perspective of the whole philosophy of law: the realization of freedom. We should note, however, that with property and contract there are simultaneously limits or restrictions to this realization.

Returning to property, we are concerned with the relationship between the will and an object. In contract, this relationship between will and thing seems to have another presupposition: there is also a relationship between different freedoms. If I am a rightful owner, it means that others recognize me as such. Freedom manifests itself in an external object, but this is only real if it is recognized by other persons.

There must be a common will that forms the basis of my will, which becomes concrete in ownership. The contract, as an exchange of things on which different freedoms agree, is in fact the basis of this recognition of each other’s freedom.

The establishment of a common will is essential. The contract expresses this common will and is the basis for the concept of property; without recognition, there is no property. The relationship between freedoms is implied in the relationship between will and object.

The object in which I place my will is external and has no existence of its own, but exists only for something else. This being for something else implies more than a mere external thing, for it expresses that I am an individual free person who places his will in a thing. The relation to other freedoms belongs structurally to property and is made explicit in the contract.

Property, then, involves not only the involvement of my will in an external thing without a will, but also the involvement of my will in the will of others. My freedom is involved in other freedoms, which makes the contract a new form of law at the same time. “Right “contains the concrete conditions for the realization of freedom.

In the contract, freedom acquires a specific existence. It is not only embodied in an external thing, but also expressed in a common will: the mutual recognition of owners. Through the contract, I acquire property by also giving up property. Through agreements with other owners, we acquire new property.

I have property because we want it. I acquire property by giving up someone else’s property, for example, by buying something. A contract is a process of mediating opposites. I own this thing and you own the other thing, but through the contract, the opposites become involved with each other and their common basis becomes visible.

As an independent owner, I am connected to the will, freedom, and recognition of the other. This shows the importance of contracts and mutual recognition for the concept of ownership and freedom in our society.
The freedom of others is not excluded. This is because in the contract I identify myself with the will of others, recognize it, and thus cease to be an owner. So the contract is a better realization of the idea of freedom. Freedom no longer exists only in the external thing that I own, but in free will: the collective will, the we-will.

The objective form of will that we get here is no longer a foreign and external thing, but another will: the common will that operates in the making of agreements. This will is less abstract or separate than property because it is rooted in the common will. The self thus becomes a self through the recognition of others.

The result of this exchange or mediation leads to selfhood. In this, selfhood is the result and also the interest of the mind. In the contract, the subjective will is raised to a higher level of generality; no longer the individual will toward the thing, but toward another individual will with which it corresponds.

So this is not an economic category, because the fact that parties make contracts because they need them, or because they pursue private interests and thus establish a common will, does not matter. Something more fundamental is at work: the interest of reason. For a contract is the realization of something general. In the contract, the partners recognize each other as owners, as free persons.

In fact, psychological and economic processes are only possible on the basis of a more fundamental dynamic: the realization of freedom. It is not that I want to recognize someone as a legal person by making a contract with him. It is not about my intentions and purposes. What matters is that the reality of the contract is actually a recognition of the personhood of another.

But even the contract is only a limited mode of existence of freedom. It is not yet the idea of freedom, the moment when understanding and reality converge.

This will become clear from further analysis of the contract or agreement. We will find that the contract does not fully explain political reality and that there is an element of arbitrariness. Finally, contracts are contested and violated. More on this in a future post.